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# THE INCARNATION AND MODERN THOUGHT

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE DIVINITY SCHOOL  
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF  
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
(DEPARTMENT OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY)

BY  
CARL DELOS CASE



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## INTRODUCTION

Referring to the attitude of the Ritschlian school to the Nicene Christology, Scott, in his book on the *Nicene Theology*, says: "The burning focus of this whole controversy and of all historical criticism of it, is the Incarnation of Christ." Indeed, outside of the Ritschlian school, the central place in all Christian systems is occupied, not simply by the Incarnation itself as a fact, but by some christological explanation of the fact. The Christology of the theologian of today is the center of his scheme of Christian doctrine. It determines his view of God, man, and the universe; his theology, anthropology, and cosmology.

There is a tendency in many of the christological systems as taught today, to minimize the philosophical elements; nor is this tendency without beneficial effect. To emphasize the "ethical apprehension of Jesus," to reproduce the "moral pictures" of Christ, to proclaim thought inferior to life, to describe dogma as a human product, has helped to restore the vigor of life to theology.

One result of this tendency has been an added emphasis on the ethically correct Christian life. "Religion," says Max Müller, "is a perception of such manifestation of the Infinite as produces an effect upon the moral character and conduct of man;" but men have been more occupied in contemplating "moral character" and "conduct" than in analyzing the "perception." This is by no means an entirely new feature of Christian thinking. It was Clement of Alexandria who was attracted to Christianity by its lofty ethical teaching and by the fruits which it bore in the practical transformation of the life. Nevertheless, Clement felt that the Christian truth commended itself to his reason; and the modern Christian need not hastily pronounce a divorce of doctrine from practice.

Another result from the tendency just mentioned is the conviction that the crowning preparation for a ripe Christian belief is experience. Conviction is produced, not through argument, but through the soul's religious processes. Doctrine is rather the flower of religious experience than its root. Theological constructions are the product, not the source, of religious life. Hence it is a mistake to place as a prerequisite of the Christian life an under-

standing of Christian doctrine. The divine order is plain: "If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it is of God, or whether I speak from myself."

According to the scholastics of the Middle Ages, the order of Christian faith is: first, *notitia*, a knowledge of the biblical teachings of Christianity; second, *assensus*, an assent to these doctrines; and third, *fiducia*, a personal acceptance of the system. Insistence upon this order is the sword at the garden, to drive away thoughtful minds. Men ask: "How do I know whether these doctrines are true?" Much infidelity can be averted by the true order: first, *notitia*, a knowledge of the person, Jesus Christ; second, *fiducia*, an intrusting of the life to him by a holy confidence; and third, gradually, and not by compulsion nor by authority, an *assensus* to the doctrines as they are demonstrated by the inner life. It is not by scientific argument or speculative reason that we are to be religious, but by the apprehension or knowledge of the person, Jesus, and the requisite attitude toward him.

Again, it is more or less acknowledged that a theological superstructure cannot be based on the uncertain foundation of science. In one of the essays in *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, Mr. Royce demonstrates the failure, from the data of modern science, to describe the succession of phenomena into the infinite. As long as the term "finite" is used, the order of nature is exact and explainable; but no possible explanation can be given of the infinite series either of the past or future. Consider all of the usual arguments for the existence and being of God, such as form the introduction to so many theological textbooks—how little capable of producing religious conviction! A God to be worshiped is not discovered as the goal of a course of reasoning, or as the conclusion of a syllogism. A statement of an order of phenomena is not a disclosure of the reality behind the phenomena. It is not from man and the world to God that we can proceed. Science finds here an impassable gulf. God must be reached by a direct method, and the divine order established: from God to the world and man.

Nevertheless, scientific and religious truth are not contradictory. God is the same; the constitution of the world and the constitution of the mind are correlates. There is no schism in truth. Nor are the deliverances of science more certain than those of religion,

both resting upon faith. In the formulation therefore of religious truth, the God and Savior of revelation must first be believed and accepted before there can result individual doctrinal belief or an accepted rationale of the universe.

In view then of these manifest advantages of a purely ethical connotation of Christian truth, and of the fact that any formulation must be of a greater worth to the Christian than to the unbeliever, the *raison d'être* of a treatise on the method of the Incarnation must be found in the affirmative answer to these two questions: first, is any theological formulation of Christian teaching in regard to the person of Christ permanent, beneficial, and trustworthy; and second, if the previous question is answered affirmatively, will it be advisable to attempt any fresh formulations?

Two of the three classes that believe in Christianity today are to be commiserated. The first class believes that the truths of revelation are to be proved similarly to the determination of the composition of water as  $H_2O$ . The second class fails to find a reasonable basis for Christianity and yet adheres to it hoping against hope. Like Jacobi, its members are Christians with their hearts and infidels with their minds.

Perhaps it is with full recognition of the inherent difficulties of the subject of Christology that Christian writers have thus written: "To know Christ is to know his benefits, not to dispute about his nature;" "the Incarnation . . . can never be comprehended by human thought;" "the problem (of the Incarnation) is insoluble with our present knowledge;" "the divinity of Christ is incapable of any adequate metaphysical explanation." But all these statements are but to declare the uselessness of the attempts of the centuries—to affirm with the old rabbinic master that when man spoke, there was only one meaning, but when God spoke, there could be from five to forty-nine meanings.

The question is a practical one. If our religious ideas are but the vapor that arises from the cauldron of our heart, then it is a blunder to condense into dogma what might have been the pent-up energy for activity. If, as Professor George B. Stevens affirms in his book on *Doctrine and Life*, we can, by separating the method of the Incarnation from the considerations which favor the fact, and by frankly admitting that the former is an absolute mystery,

cause the idea of the Incarnation to commend itself to us, then why waste energy in producing the contrary effect?

The western mind, however, demands a synthesis and classification. The simple affirmation to unbelievers of the fact of the Incarnation reveals a vital reason for attempting a statement of the Incarnation which shall be both definite and consistent with the biblical data. Erroneous conceptions need the opposition of correct views. Even if there is no intention of constructing a new system, the very act of undermining a false structure supplies material for a new formation. When one enunciates reasons for accepting the self-revelation of God through Christ to the human race, and for affirming that Christ has the value of God to men, however we intertwine moral terms, we have the beginnings of a theology. The very manipulation of words demands a condition of intellectual development raised above mere feeling and sentiment.

It is an extreme view that no certain knowledge can be gained of God outside the historical Christ, for there is a revelation of God both in the heavens that declare his glory, and in the heart of man that receives the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world. There are two sources of the knowledge of God, and they must and can be correlated. From a scientific view of the world arises a corresponding philosophy; and this philosophy must agree with the Christian philosophy, which, to a Christian, arises from his observation of the revelation in Christ. There cannot be dualistic philosophies existing side by side in the same mind; and the effort to unify them will compel the thinker to reduce them to a common terminology.

The problem rests here: Grant the historical event of Christ's revelation, and you must have a philosophy arising from your view of the facts of the Christian revelation; but grant a Christian philosophy, and you must connect it with the philosophy that arises from your view of the world. Notice a late statement of this. In the preface of President Schurman's *Belief in God*, this statement is found: "No theological belief can rest on a mere historical occurrence. An open-eyed theology must have a philosophical basis." And later, in the body of the book, he says: "I do not hide, therefore, the conviction that the problem of the modern theist consists in the union of the Aryan and Semitic modes

of interpreting existence. We must have a synthesis of the Father of all spirits with the ground of all nature. In other words, we shall be satisfied with nothing less than anthropocosmic theism." It must be acknowledged, however, that philosophers generally, starting from a philosophical *Weltanschauung*, have not felt obligated to conform their idea of the Absolute to the view of God arising from the Christian revelation. Hence arises the apologetic question: Why should the philosopher start from the Christian consciousness more than from the Buddhistic consciousness, and why from either? This previous question is, however, not considered in the present discussion. To the Christian, the two views cannot be regarded as generically antithetic, and his Christian must include his human consciousness.

It is also apparent that a Soteriology must rest on an adequate Christology. To lose the objective and real Christ is to dissipate Christianity. Faith will refuse to rest on that which the mind refuses to examine. A study of the Synoptic Gospels reveals, to be sure, the ethical elements of the presentation of Christ as pre-eminent; but the ethical has a basis in the metaphysical. The center of the ethical character and mission of Jesus is his person, and the significance of Christ's person must be measured by his relation to God, man, and the world.

It fascinates a modern mind to think that the idea is the content, and the husk, in which the idea comes, is unessential; the kernel lives and is reproductive, the shell is accidental and transitory. But suppose the observer watches the practical effect of the attempt to discard the husk and save the kernel? Note the opinion of Professor Green and Thomas Carlyle, that if Arianism had won, Christianity would have dwindled away to a legend. Note the logical drift of the Unitarian church, that began with the denial of the deity of Christ, and now admits anyone to the church—Buddhist or Mohammedan—providing he wants to receive or give help. In the words of one of their speakers: "We have stripped off every rag. We have destroyed all the machinery."

Richard H. Hutton, in his *Theological Essays*, indicates some of the influences which compelled him to accept the Incarnation as the central truth of the Christian revelation. In answer to the difficulty that the "infinite being could not become finite, or take up human nature into his own, except as a mere simulated appear-

ance," he says that the difficulty has entirely disappeared for him. By noting the phenomena of paralysis in which the richest powers of a man of genius which seemed to belong to him, identified with his personality, are stripped from him and he is reduced to a poor solitary ego, or perhaps lives in two worlds, in one of which he is a feeble, helpless, isolated will and in the other a man of genius still, it seems to Mr. Hutton to be—

simply the most presumptuous of all presumptuous assumptions to deny that the Son of God might have really entered into a finite being. . . . If there is an indestructible moral individuality which constitutes *self*, which is the same when wielding the largest powers and when it sits alone at the dark center—which may even live under a double set of conditions at the same time—I can see no metaphysical contradiction in an Incarnation.

Plainly the view as touched upon by Mr. Hutton in the above quotation, is what Dr. A. B. Bruce calls the "double life" theory. With Mr. Hutton, it removes the intellectual difficulties for an honest acceptance of Jesus as the Christ of God. The "double life" or any other theory is not proved true because it removes barriers to belief, nor is a personal and saving knowledge of Christ synonymous with an acceptance of a christological theory. An intellectual conception must not be confounded with a religious apprehension. Nevertheless, a system of beliefs which corresponds to our intellectual experiences and yet is made plumb with biblical truth is shown by Mr. Hutton's experience to be helpful. Such a system may and should be recognized as being human-made and more or less temporary in form. History should never repeat itself in making council-made creeds the condition of salvation.

The second question submitted for answer is: Is a fresh formulation of Christian teaching, and especially of the doctrine of Christ, beneficial and necessary?

There is a strong present tendency to regard "Scripture terms and categories as alone authorized and as alone competent to express a true and adequate doctrine of the person of Jesus." Yet, as far as Christ was concerned, he never formulated a system of faith. Paul's teachings were produced under the stress of opposition, and therefore the various epistles must supplement each other. It is even fair to suppose, from the temporary occasion of their composition, that all together do not in every instance give a complete presentation of a given subject. Paul himself says: "Now

we know in part." The interpretation of Christ's life in the New Testament, therefore, was true but not exhaustive. Nevertheless, the teaching of the New Testament must be the mold about which all later statements are to be formed; and as the teachings of the New Testament are ever more clearly understood, a restatement of Christian doctrine must be made which shall correspond to the New Testament standard.

Passing to the later centuries, the same statement must assuredly be made. We shall never possess terms or ideas sufficient to express the myriad relationships of Christ. We shall never have enough experiences in whose solution all alloys shall be dissolved from the nugget of truth. The last word has not yet been spoken concerning the person of Christ.

That is true of Christianity, which Max Müller avers of all forms of religion in general:

It is seldom borne in mind that without constant return to its fountain head, every religion, even the most perfect, nay, the most perfect on account of its very perfection more even than others, suffers from its contact with the world, as the purest air suffers from the mere fact of its being breathed.

Alien elements which have adhered to the systems of beliefs but have not been nor can ever be assimilated, must be detached that normal growth may ensue.

Again, Christianity must have power of adaptation. "Mahomet as he was rules Mahometans as they are," says Hutton. But Christianity is growing; it makes vital connections with each age. The great desideratum of an adequate Christology is a modern mold of thought. After the historical student has made the year 2,000 the year 30, the Aryan mind the Semitic, and Europe Palestine, the process must be reversed. The principles of the Palestinian presentation of Christ must be translated into the thought and speech of the present day.

All of God's revelations have been mediated by historical conditions. We cannot have a historic religion which does not integrate itself into our conceptions. Past statements of Christian doctrine are not necessarily the best, even though we must unhesitatingly retain the data of the revelation. "Every age," says Schaff, "must produce its own apologetics, adapted to prevailing tendencies and wants."

This acknowledgment of mutability in theology must apply

also to doctrine as accepted today. Our interpretations can never be fixed or absolutely authoritative as a test of doctrine, except in so far as they render impossible misstatements of the facts themselves. The facts are permanent; the interpretations temporal.

Our little systems have their day;  
They have their day and cease to be;  
They are but broken lights of thee,  
And thou, O Lord, art more than they.

The Spirit of God still moves on the face of history. The main currents of life and thought have been regulated by Providence. Though there have been currents and eddies, Christian thought has flowed on toward the ocean of infinite truth.

To change the formulation does not change the truth, even though it be granted that the older formulation did not express the whole truth. The older form was a true manifestation, but did not exhaust the content. Even the word "Logos" may have been simply the form or coin of an early age, while the bullion may be remelted for the philosophical molds of other times. The idea is permanent; the mold transient, and not fully adequate, as no philosophical term ever is, to the idea. Yet even today the ancient philosophical form expresses a truth the validity of which the modern form does not annul. The term need never be entirely superseded, and never should be if it belongs to the New Testament, even though later terminology may have intervened.

The Christ as known tomorrow will assume larger meaning to the world. A conception of Christ which did not touch the practical thought and life of a generation would be a burden to faith. Christ must be complete to every age, the best expression of its life, the full realization of its ideals, the adequate interpretation of its thought.

The possibility and advisability, both of accepting any theological system whatsoever and of making a fresh contribution to theological thought, have now been affirmed. Not that any one author can lead the development of doctrine along correct lines, or bound the ocean of thought by a coral reef. To form a closed system, to bottle up truth in labeled vessels of definition, is but to repeat a false history. This present treatise not only does not purpose to furnish a permanent system of Christology but not even a system, attempting rather to indicate the perspective lines

upon the canvas according to which, it seems to the author, the future theologian will fix the unity of his picture and lay in the living colors; or, to change the figure, to indicate the tendencies in accordance with which truth is being enveloped in its human garment.

But how shall this be done? Harnack may give the answer:

For the historian, however, who does not wish to serve a party, there are two standards in accordance with which he may criticize the history of dogma. He may either; as far as possible, compare it with the Gospel, or he may judge it according to the historical conditions of the time and the result.

So much for the examination of a dogma of the past. For the presentation of any possible formulation of truth the same two criteria may be used—a fidelity to the gospel standard, on the one side, and a compliance with the present historical conditions, on the other. The former requirement should be met by an inductive study of the New Testament to determine the exact content of the gospel standard; the latter requirement should be met as any tenet is re-examined and restated in view of the later developments of science and philosophy.

According to the plan above outlined, the treatment of the *Incarnation and Modern Thought* should be divided into two parts: first, an examination of the books of the New Testament, to formulate certain christological canons, which shall be the standards for any future as well as past Christology; and second, to indicate, both in accordance with these canons and the behests of modern thought, the larger lines of the features of any future Christology. The studies included in the first part, not traversing new subjects of investigation, will not be presented here. It will be sufficient to specify results in what may be called "The christological Canons of the New Testament."

1. God and man are akin.
2. There is in all states of Jesus Christ an identity of subject.
3. In both the pre-existent and exalted states, he is the principle by which the universe is a cosmos and all physical and spiritual life exist.
4. In his pre-existent state he was possessed of divine conditions and powers, and yet essentially human in nature, without beginning, dwelling eternally in divine and equal association with

the Father, the self-manifesting element of God, God's sole and sufficient revelation, and the source of all moral and spiritual enlightenment.

5. In his earthly state he was sinless, the ideal man, rendering perfect obedience to God, ethically one with the Father, an adequate ethical representation and manifestation of God. He lived a normal human life, not as an assumption but a natural transformation of the divine life, emptied of all heavenly powers and privileges. He grew in knowledge and moral perfection, enduring temptation, depending upon God in every religious and moral activity, with a life mediated by the Holy Spirit.

6. In his exalted state, he has both a local and universal existence.

These canons are not intended to be an exhaustive statement of New Testament christological axioms, but a presentation of those principles which show an affinity for certain products of modern thought. They have a twofold value, both to test any system of theological thought bequeathed by the past, and to be the architectural design for any future construction. In accordance with this latter use, they can now be connected with such philosophical and scientific conceptions as divine immanence, the exaltation of man at the head of creation, social and racial solidarity, evolutionary development, unity of consciousness, and with the more Christian conceptions of the ethical nature of God and the universal and vitalizing presence of the Holy Spirit.

## CHAPTER I

### THE LOGOS IN THE WORLD—DIVINE IMMANENCE

The doctrine of the immanence of God is the presupposition of all science. On the one side, the various forms of physical interaction can be accounted for only by a substantial unity of all material things, and an orderly universe is possible only as there is an indwelling presence of God. On the other side, without the immanent God, there would be no correspondence between mind and matter, or at least no knowledge of matter by mind that could be considered trustworthy. The reasonable basis of science is the doctrine of the immanence of God.

The doctrine of the divine immanence of God as opposed to a one-sided emphasis of the doctrine of the transcendence of God has not only long been popularized by such literary endeavors as that of Emerson, but has of late been expressed in many philosophical forms. One of these philosophical forms is a monism that teaches that there is one underlying principle of all reality. There are two extremes of monism, pantheism in which matter is all in all, and idealism in which God is all in all. The mean of monism is the doctrine of the immanence of God, God in his universe, the infinite ever expressing itself in the finite.

In support of the view that forms of a monistic philosophy are gaining a wider support, Professor Ladd may be quoted: "Dualism, as a claimant for the position of a rational and consistent system of thinking, is undoubtedly being discredited by the progress of the age." And yet elsewhere, after stating that the new form of physiological psychology has a strong monistic tendency favoring a monistic philosophy, he says that this psychology does not deny "the derived and independent reality of either the body or the mind." For either scientific or purely theological purposes, it is sufficient to abide by the use of the term, "the Immanence of God," which on the one hand does not deny "the derived and independent reality of either the body or the mind," and yet affirms a unity of the universe as dependent upon the indwelling presence of God.

One form of this monistic philosophy attains to still higher

affirmations. It not only proclaims a universal underlying substance as the principle of all existences and the source of all interactions, but it declares that this basal unity is possessed of self-consciousness, intelligence, and will. So Ladd says: "This monism must find the unity of all being and knowledge, the World-ground, in an ideal Reality, a realized Ideal. Such a one is nothing less than some rational, self-conscious, and personal life." Lotze, as a representative of a pure monism, identifies his conception of the one substance with his conception of the living God, and defines the all-one substance as the absolutely good and the all-personality.

This extreme form of a monistic philosophy corresponds to Christ's teaching. The Jews had recognized the activity of God even in the minute affairs of the universe, but considered God as separate from the universe mechanically ordering the world. The teaching of the omnipresence of God, but not a true immanence, is to be found in the sermons of the prophets. Still later, superstitious belief created a series of intermediate beings to administer the government of the world and God was relegated to a more distant realm. But it was Jesus, with his fresher ideas of divine providence, who taught that even a sparrow could not fall to the ground without the heavenly Father, and Paul affirms that in God "we live and move and have our being."

The church of today has received the heritage of two diverse views of the early church, the Greek and the Latin. The Greek was the first to be dominant, and the early church Fathers, such as Clement, Origen, Athanasius, under the influence of the Greek philosophy, saw in God "the ever-present life of the world." The Latin idea, differing essentially from the Greek, emphasized the transcendence of God, sovereignty enforced from the central throne of the universe. The Latin view survived under the dominating influence of a monarchical form of government, and was crystallized in the church organization. Not until the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in the thinking of the heretics of the time was the Greek idea at all restored. The doctrine of the Immanence of God found no place in the theology of Calvin, and even today the heritage of the past renders it difficult to secure the oriental turn of thought necessary to conceive of the Immanence of God. But a return is being made to the Greek conception, and when all doc-

trines shall be restated with reference to this vitalizing world-view, the work shall have been completed.

The question whether religion is extraneous or native to man's nature has been largely discussed during the last fifty years. In Kidd's *Social Evolution*, religion is represented as that non-natural although necessary force which makes life bearable by overcoming the struggle for existence. But the *Ascent of Man* finds in religion a natural expression of that Love-for-another which is a part of the universal constitution of the world. Evolution was pushing religion out of the domain of the world, but religion outflanked the enemy, and entered the very camp of science. It claimed an original occupation of the field.

The Immanence of God puts a new interpretation into the cosmological argument. President Schurman objects to the view that atoms are "manufactured articles." "What is needed," he says, "is not a supernatural creation of a non-existent world but a natural interpretation of the world we find actually given." God is not simply the final cause in the succession of causes, but is the present producer of the energy by which matter is sustained and mind is existent. Deny the creation of the world, and God will still be found, and in a surer way, as the fundamental reality, without which all other realities are non-existent.

All causation is to be considered as the expression of God's will. Secondary causes exist but not irrespective of that will. All natural causation appears mechanical because regular. The irregular has been termed miracle. But the world is not a machine, or a Paley's watch, nor is God arbitrary, not acting always in the same way under the same circumstances. The world is both rational and moral. There is an orderly succession of phenomena, not on account of the commandments of God, but because it is in God's nature that as one phenomenon occurs, there shall be a certain compensation, appearing in another phenomenon.

Thus the former distinction between the natural and supernatural is broken down. It is customary to trace the secondary causes back to the supreme and final cause, with breaks in the succession interposed by the supreme cause. So the penumbra of the unknown has been regarded as God's domain, and consequently, as the circle of the unknown has been growing smaller with zero as its limit, theism seemed on the point of becoming practical

atheism. God is to be seen, then, not in the uncommon alone but in the common; indeed more wonderfully in the common than in the uncommon. The world is not a statue chiseled by God, and partially representing him; but animate with his life. God is not to be found by going out of the world, as thought Hypatia and the neo-Platonists, but by a loving and reverent response to the ever-present Father. The supernatural as far as it differs from the natural is but a varying method of God's action in the universe consonant with God's nature and purposes. In idealistic monism the subject of greatest difficulty is the freedom of the will, which seems to form a new center of activity separate from the universal life. This is true according to the doctrine of the Immanence of God, in so far as God has thus limited the free expression of his will in human personalities; but not true in so far as nothing can or does exist without the sustaining power of the Almighty. Le Conte represents the vital principle of plants and animals and man as being the various grades of the "gradually increasing individuation of the divine energy." Thus the ganglion of the human will is a redistributing center for the divine will, not altogether independent nor yet subject to an absorption of the personality. A relative independence is to be conceded man's will, according to a right view of the Immanence of God.

Then is God responsible for the sin in the world? How natural it is to say: "God is not omnipresent, if he is not also in the man who sins; he is not almighty, if he admits evil into the world." It is true that no system of theology can entirely escape this difficulty. But the end is not yet reached, and the final judgment of the world's history cannot be made until the race's course is run. Undoubtedly it must be said by the Christian theist, that the possibility of sin, though not the fact of sin, was a necessity for the flowering out of the best life of the universe. The brightest type of Christian optimism sees something in Paul's bright vision: "every knee shall bow," and knows the sun will scatter the chiaroscuro of changing evil and good in the world's history.

The doctrine of the Immanence of God teaches that God is the life of the universe, not identical with it, nor exhausted by it. God cannot be conceived as quantitatively filling all space. He has possibilities of actualizing his will beyond the wildest human dreams. God is to be conceived as both immanent and transcendent, and

therefore perfectly free in all his operations in the universe. The "arrival of the fittest" which is the previous problem to the "survival of the fittest" in evolution finds its explanation here. The added increment in the progress of evolution is due to the eternal vitalizing energy of God.

The sun, the moon, the stars, the seas, the hills and the plains,—  
Are not these, O Soul, the Vision of Him who reigns?

Speak to Him, thou, for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet—  
Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.

The transition in thought must now be made from the scientific or philosophical view of this doctrine of divine Immanence to the theological. Of science as such, Christianity has nothing to say. However, it receives the philosophical world-principle and connects it with its own doctrines. That which is at the basis of our confidence in the uniformity of phenomena, that which is conceived as the cause of the higher teleology as by Romanes and Fraser, is not only a person, as has already been seen, but the Logos. One school of thought may insist upon the separation of our knowledge of nature and our belief in Christ, but the teachings of John and Paul are congenial to modern thought, presenting an ontological basis for salvation. The doctrine of the Immanence of the Logos is not extraneous to Christian belief. All of the offices of the incarnate Son in the work of redemption and regeneration have their basis in the cosmical relations of Christ. There must be a present Christ, but not by the creation of the body and blood in the Eucharist. Jesus is here in vital connection with believing hearts, not by an unnatural process, but because all human beings have their ground in the life of the Logos. Rightly then did Justin Martyr hold that there was a true revelation in philosophy because of the Word "that lighteth every man that cometh into the world."

The Incarnation is the most natural of occurrences. The defect in early Christology was in treating the Incarnation as an absolute miracle. But there must be less of what Dr. Simon calls the "air of exceptionality." Deny the Immanence of God, and the Incarnation becomes arbitrary and mechanical. Witness Arius who conceived God as at an infinite distance from the world in solitary existence, only communicating to this world through the supernatural man, neither divine nor human, called Christ. To think of

the person of Christ as the great disturbance of nature belittles the grandeur of the cosmic scheme, and connects Christ only arbitrarily with the salvation of the world. But regarding God as immanent, it would be unscientific to affirm the impossibility of the Incarnation. When the Logos is the cohesive principle of the universe, the Incarnation cannot be a break in the established system.

Referring again to the quotation above made from Le Conte, that the plant, the animal, and man are but the individuation in various conditions of the all-pervading force, the divine energy, this sentence is found: "Again a spark of the pervading energy struggles still upward, and under still higher conditions, completes its individuality and becomes a living soul, or immortal spirit of man." Using the same terminology and waiving at present the consideration of the difference of nature between Christ and human beings, could not Christ thus be described, and would not his advent seem as natural? If God is immanent, the connection between the divine and human in Christ has not been arbitrarily made; instead of the old enforced alliance between the human and divine, there is a vital union. To deny the immanence of God is to emphasize the divine nature of Christ at the expense of the human, while in fact the Incarnation is a revelation in flesh, not a concealing of the God who is all in all.

## CHAPTER II

### THE LOGOS IN HUMANITY—DIVINE AND HUMAN KINSHIP

It was Dorner who once wrote: "To true christological knowledge it is necessary above all to sound the depths of the idea of deity and of the idea of humanity in their relation to each other; the possibility and significance of their union in one person will then become clear of themselves." And not only does the reality of the divine-human personality depend upon the relationship between the human and the divine, but the adequacy and character of redemption. What man is in Christ as well as what Christ is as God in the world, depends upon the relation which obtains between the divine and human. By some the creation and sustentation of matter is regarded as a self-limitation of God, because matter is regarded as finite and not a pliable agent of God's will. If so, it is a limitation self-imposed by God, not subversive of God's omnipotence. If the sustentation of matter is self-limitation, then the self-limitation must be greater in the higher grades of life-organizations until where there is the self-centered will of man, the self-limitation is at its greatest. And yet must not this self-sacrifice be for a great moral purpose worthy of the nature of God? And whatever that moral purpose is—and the gospel reveals it—that is the motive for the Incarnation, which according to this view must be God's supreme act of self-limitation. And as the purpose is one, so is the character of the self-limitation the same—God immanent in his universe limiting himself in matter, in organic forms, in human personalities, and in the Son of God, the climactic expression of God's love, and the most natural yet supernatural individuation of his life.

The ever-present problem of the early church was the unification of the divine and human in Christ with the ever-present danger of losing the uniqueness of the sonship of Christ while securing an adequate redemption for man by virtue of this union. The danger assumed so large proportions at the time of the Eutychian controversy that the doctrine that the divine nature is consubstantial with ours has ever since been declared heretical. Seventeen centuries of unsuccessful endeavor to make lifelike the divine-human

nature of Christ ended in a deistic rationalism which made the divine and human contradictory terms and consigned God to the edge of the universe, leaving men to hear, as Jean Paul Richter says, "the screech of a Fatherless world."

The reactionary philosophy, teaching the absolute unity of the human existence with the divine, which Fichte, as an exponent of this speculative tendency, called "the profoundest insight man can attain," failed again in not recognizing Christ as *the* Son of God. It gave, however, a greater prominence to the eternal significance of human sonship, and aided philosophy in its renewed attempts at explaining Christ. Today that which Dorner said is still true: "The characteristic feature of all recent Christologies is the endeavor to point out the essential unity of the divine and human."

Science also as well as philosophy magnifies the kinship of God and man. It affirms that the world was built for man. The long processes of evolution culminating in the production of man reveals the nature of God by the highest product of the process, that is, man. Man alone knows the language of God, bows to the obligation of the Ought, and responds to the Father's love. So Agassiz says: "Man is the end toward which all the animal creation has tended." Bruce says: "In man all that went before finds its rationale." And the significance of this process culminating in man, Professor Fiske shows by the words: "When from the dawn of life we see all things working together toward the evolution of the highest spiritual attributes of Man, we know, however the words may stumble in which we try to say it, that God is in the deepest sense a moral Being."

In other words, God and man are not two extremes excluding each other. There is a community of nature, a relationship in the same genus. Adam is the son of God and Jesus is the son of Adam; the line of descent is continuous. The original constitution of man was stamped with the image of God, which image was not lost by the fall. Man is like God, and therefore God is like man. Anthropomorphism is in all of our ideas of God, as indeed all facts of science are known and interpreted in terms derived from the constitution and action of the human mind. The anthropomorphization of God and the apotheosis of man are both attributable to the essential likeness of the two. If the statement in Genesis that man is made in the image of God is interpreted in the light of the



New Testament passages, that the world was made by Christ, it follows that man was created after the image of Christ. Certainly in Christ do all things exist, and from him do all human beings derive and perpetuate their personality. "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." Or as Whittier wrote of a negro in a slave mart,

In that sad victim then,  
Savior of pitying men,  
I see Thee stand.

The Scripture teaches also that men are the offspring of God. Three hundred years before Christ, Aratus, a native of Cilicia, Paul's own province, wrote:

From Zeus begin: and never let us leave  
His name unloved. With him, with Zeus are filled  
All paths we tread and all the marts of men;  
Filled, too, the sea and every creek and bay;  
And all, in all things, need we help of Zeus,  
For we, too, are his offspring.

And Paul quotes approvingly.

The fatherhood of God meant to the ancient Jew the patriarchal authority possessed by the head of a large household; to the Roman, unbounded authority of legal control, limited only by the death penalty; to the modern American—if we trust Spencer—slavery to the small tyrants of the household. Through every one of these definitions, all insufficient, has God been viewed and described. Creatorship is not fatherhood or else sonship would not be limited to the human family, neither does the goodness and graciousness of God alone constitute him a father though God sustains moral relations to man; but fatherhood means, in its natural sense, that man was created in the image of God. Man is a personality, self-conscious, intelligent, with self-determination and moral susceptibilities. As such he belongs to God's family.

Sin does not destroy this original relationship. Sin is not essential to the eternal plan of God, nor to our conception of man's personality. The branch is still a part of the vine, though the ligature has obstructed the flow of life. Man saved or unsaved is the offspring of God.

But there is another, a deeper sense of sonship to God taught

in the New Testament, or else every man, by virtue of the indwelling of the Logos within him, irrespective of the Incarnation, would be a son of God. This sonship, or adoption as son, is brought about by believing upon Christ. In conjunction with this adoption as son, God sends the Holy Spirit to bring into the consciousness this sonship as vital and real. Accordingly evil men are called children of the devil, whether the term is used by Christ or Paul; and those who are Godlike, loving their enemies, are children of the Father. The latter, however, can only become children of the Father as they are born of the Spirit. It is plainly taught that only those who have been born again are capable of being Godlike in nature and action.

Some have thought to make these two conceptions of sonship irreconcilable, at least as far as the Bible is concerned. "We cannot," says Fairbairn, "accept Luther's article of a standing or falling church as our *principium essendi*. It is Paul's rather than Christ's; it may be true, but it still remains what it was at first—a deduction by a disciple, not a principle enunciated by the Master." Nor did the dualism—if such there be—cease in the New Testament. The one idea, the universal fatherhood, had a history in Greek theology which emphasized the essential unity of God and man. The other idea, the limited sonship, dwelt exclusively in the Latin theology, which emphasized the separation of God and man except under certain prescribed conditions. There is a unity between God and man, in essential nature; there is a separation, in ethical unlikeness. Christ was son of God by virtue of his ethical oneness with God; man, as ethically one with God, is also son of God, only he cannot attain unto this ethical oneness until the life of Christ breaks the ligature of sin and brings him again into vital connection with the eternal source of life. One is the natural sonship; the other, the spiritual. One is physical, the other ethical. But the spiritual sonship is never possible without the basis of the natural. God is ever the Father both naturally and ethically; but man is not so ethically until the Holy Spirit becomes the channel of a new life from Jesus Christ.

Through the kinship of the divine and human, humanity has the capacity for the divine, and is not, as in a Latin atmosphere is taught, unsuitable for spirit abode, or an inadequate expression of the Logos. The seed of life cannot be implanted where there is

not a proper environment. Humanity was the proper foundation for the superstructure of the divine. The Logos could never have been incarnated in a lower form of animal life. Thus Luther's dictum must be true: *Finitum capax infiniti*. "It takes a God to discern a God," says Novalis; so it takes the divine to receive the divine. Christ was "*manifested* at the end of the times," not *concealed*. It is through the medium of the humanity that the Logos is revealed, not apart from it. With the Immanence of God, and then above that, the divine and human kinship, we shall turn from every form of Docetism or Ebionitism to the true Incarnation of the Word. We cannot prove the divinity of Christ unless man himself be regarded as divine. Once we made man as little as possible to prove Christ's divinity; now we make him as great as possible. That which is human is not ideally human unless divine, and the final argument for the divinity of Christ is his perfect humanity.



### CHAPTER III THE LOGOS IN HUMANITY—RACE SOLIDARITY

A race unity is generally acknowledged to be one of the presuppositions of religion, though the character of that unity has more or less escaped definition. Two New Testament passages show that one bond of racial unity is the common relation of the members of the race to Adam, though this relation is limited to man's sinful condition as derived from the race's first ancestor.<sup>1</sup> Certainly human beings are all descendants of Adam, and perhaps in this sense are all "of one."<sup>2</sup> As truly, also, there is a stream of hereditary influence predisposing the heart to evil, flowing from the origin of the race to the present time. There is also an interpretation whereby Adam was appointed the representative head of the race, the individuals of the race being all bound by his actions. But whether these or other like theories are true, they do not assist in the furtherance of the present problem, except as the general statement can be made that the race has somewhat of a corporate existence.

A social solidarity is much in speech at present. So much is each individual a part of the social order, that the slightest action of one affects the welfare of the whole, as does the throwing of the pebble have its influence, though small, upon the universe. The solidarity is, however, a poetical conception based upon the countless interactionary influences prevalent in society. Gladstone has declared that the "personality of societies is not any mere metaphysical or theological abstraction, nor a phrase invented for the purpose of discussion, but a reality, having its own palpable exponents in the persons of those who are the organs of society." But real though the social solidarity is, the race has not thereby a corporate existence.

Between Christ and the regenerate portion of humanity, there is a corporate unity which is real, not poetical. Christ is the head of

<sup>1</sup> Rom. 5:12; I Cor. 15:22.

<sup>2</sup> Acts 17:26.

the church and the church is the body of which Christ is the life and unifying principle. This corporate unity furnishes an analogy for the wider corporate unity of the race. As in Christ do all things consist, and as from the Logos all known beings derive their life and personality, it follows that the solidarity of the race is based upon its relation to the Logos. The undercurrents of influence and responsibility have their reasonable explanation only as the Logos is regarded as the fundamental reality of humanity without which neither the race nor any individual of the race can exist. The statement of the French preacher, Bersier: "In my individual life I feel the life of humanity, in my blood the life-stream of the race," can only be true as the Logos is the unifying principle of the human race.

The dependence of the race upon the Logos is not merely nominal. Each individual draws life and personality from him. I am bound to my neighbor because the Logos is in him as in me; the brotherhood of man is assured by the unity of the race in Christ, and yet the personalities of human beings differ as the Logos differentiates the common life in various individuals.

The practical bearing of this doctrine of racial solidarity is to be seen in the doctrine of redemption. Christ's essential relationship to humanity is to be connected with the biblical teachings of the Atonement, of sonship, of vital union with Christ. Christ can die for all, and it is possible to rescue all, because he came as an individual into a corporate humanity which he himself constituted a unity. The authors of *Progressive Orthodoxy* state that the articles of the book are written under the guidance of a central and vital principle of Christianity—"the reality of Christ's personal relation to the human race as a whole and to every member of it." Truly, as D. W. Simon says: "The conception of the organic unity, or solidarity of the whole of humanity, is not indeed very distinctly expressed in the Scripture; but it certainly lies at the back of and conditions their teachings, especially regarding redemption." If the individuals of the human race had had no vital connection with each other, salvation by incarnation as far as human wisdom can understand would have been impossible.

Justin Martyr said that "the whole race of man had part in the Logos." Here is to be found a reasonable basis for the Incarnation. It was possible for the Word to become flesh in the human

race of which the Word was the principle of existence and unity. The man Christ Jesus was thus connected with the whole race, an individual among individuals, the Word made flesh, God manifest in humanity. "His individuality," says Martensen, "stands in the relation to all other human individualities in which the center of a circle stands to all the single points of the circle."

## CHAPTER IV

### THE LOGOS IN THE INDIVIDUAL—THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS

The conclusions already reached, divine Immanence, divine and human kinship, and race solidarity, all tend to overlook the differences between the man Christ Jesus and other men. Christ may be a more striking variation, "an individual variation of apparently spontaneous origin," but is he also different in type? The doctrine of evolution also seems to negative the spiritual and moral supremacy of Christ. It is not sufficient to say that the human race is a degeneration and that Christ is a restoration to type. This would satisfy evolution, but not Christianity. Christ is something more than an unfallen Adam. Neither is Christ, according to a theistic evolution, a "devolution" from above foreign to the constitution of the human race. The Incarnation was not a *deus ex machinâ* into the arena of the world, previously godless. Theistic evolution agrees with atheistic evolution that there has never been an introduction of a foreign force into the realm of nature, but denies that what you find anywhere in the series is to be found in germ in the first of the series, and that the new spiritual force of the Incarnation was a recombination or expression of the elements of the past. The constant increment of progress in the evolution of the universe is added by the immanent Christ in whom all things consist.

Progressive revelation is a method of God. "When the fulness of time was come," God was manifested in the flesh. A prior personal revelation would have been an anachronism. All preceding manifestations were but immature developments of the perfect revelation. A final perfect revelation makes the evolutionary process possess significance. Revelation becomes constantly richer until it reaches a culmination in Christ; or rather revelation is a great momentum in history forming the nucleus of a religious future culminating in the kingdom of God. Hegel has shown that a historical person was needed to reveal to the common consciousness the unity of the divine and human nature. The Idea must be something seen, the Divine must appear in the form of what is Immediate. But what is true of one phase of the divine revela-

tion in Hegel's system, is true of all revelation. As Van Dyke says in his book, *The Gospel for an Age of Doubt*: "Each successive step in this manifestation realizes and exhibits something higher and more perfect, to which all that has gone before has pointed, and in which the potentialities of all previous developments are not only summed up, but raised to a new power."

Now if Christ was unique, there are but two solutions of the problem of his appearance: either he was an absolute interference in the realm of nature, or else a term in the sequence of natural causes. The former solution has already been negatived. The latter solution can only be accepted as the uniqueness of Jesus is left unimpaired. It is admitted that in nature there have been great epochs in the process of development. At the present, three great crises at least in the evolutionary process are recognized, where there have been no known antecedents: the origin of matter or of material reactions under the present system, the origin of life, and the origin of self-conscious life. From the standpoint of atheistic evolution, these are unexplainable chasms in the process. Nor indeed, are these all of the unexplainable changes. Any variation that marks a higher stage of development has no scientific explanation. Science has accounted for the survival of the fittest, but not for the arrival of the fittest.

Le Conte, in *Religion and Science*, thus gives his acknowledgment of this lack on the part of science:

My own very strong conviction . . . is that no theory of evolution yet proposed explains the origin of species; that the factors mentioned above (pressure of external conditions, improvement of organs by use, divergent variation of offspring, and survival of the fittest) may produce varieties, but not species, much less genera, orders and classes; that the great factor of change and the real cause of evolution is still unknown. Evolution may be the universal formal law of the Universe (of time) but the cause of the law is yet undiscovered.

All that Christianity asks is that the increments of progress be denominated after the manner of Lotze—continual divine reinforcements. The pivotal question is not what is the process of development, but what is the origin of any variation; and this is to be answered according to New Testament teachings, by affirming that the Logos is both the principle of all existences and the cause of differentiation. Christ is not then to be placed in a natural

sequence. He is the beginning of a variation, "the firstborn among many brethren," a new and original force in the world added by the Logos in whom all things consist. As a beginning of a new species, as a new order in the natural universe, Christ is not contrary to the course of nature, but is to be expected where three crises par excellence have already occurred. Thus was Christ unique, as George Harris in *Moral Evolution* says: "In many respects Jesus was a distinct type; . . . as transcending all others he was a new cause, the power of God in higher potency."

Although in evolution the perfect is at the end of the series, Christ came in the course of human history because he was the beginning of the variation. Nevertheless, the development of the race is not contrary to the usual evolutionary processes. Evolution is ever working for the perfection of the species, while the individuals seem to be lost in the process. The kingdom of God adheres to the first principle but reverses the second; there is to be both a social and an individual completion. All things on earth and in heaven find their culmination in Christ. All things were created unto (as) him. The kingdom of God, as the parables of the Sower and the Leaven and the Mustard Seed evince, is an evolutionary process. It does not come ready made as according to Jewish conception. He, who is the commencement of a new order, will be reincarnated in human beings, until the whole body, filled with his fulness, shall mark the culmination and perfection of the Christian evolutionary development.

## CHAPTER V

### THE LOGOS IN THE INDIVIDUAL—PSYCHOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES

The doctrine of the two natures in Christ has always been the insoluble difficulty for any Christology. Perhaps it is always wiser, if one accepts the doctrine, frankly to acknowledge ignorance as does Bishop Morehouse, who says: "I answer at once, that the manner of this wondrous hypostatic union is a mystery too great for me." The formula of the Council of Chalcedon is still valid as a definition of the two natures, though it has been variously interpreted, even as is the constitution of a state, in ways unthought of by the original formulators. A part of it reads:

One and the same Christ, . . . manifested in two natures, without confusion, without conversion, indivisible, inseparable, the distinction of natures being by no means abolished by the union, but rather the property of each preserved and combined into one person and one hypostasis.

A conjunction or a blending is not to be thought of. There is interpenetration of natures, but each retains its own properties so that it can be said, "The same perfect in Deity, and the same perfect in humanity, truly God, and the same truly man."

The serious objection to the formula of Chalcedon is not that Jesus is made an anomalous personality, for mystery is to be expected in the person of Christ, but that the living unity of Christ's person is virtually denied. The Bible knows nothing of the union into one of the human and divine natures, nor of the attempted combination of the attributes of the divine personality and the attributes of the human in ways impossible to conceive. Even the best statement made of the union, such a one for example as Van Oosterzee's, "Both natures have communicated their properties to one and the same person," has little content on account of the difficulty of separating in definition "personality" and "nature."

The practical, that is a soteriological as well as psychological, problem in connection with the Chalcedon formula is to give due prominence to the human nature of Christ. There must be a human nature in Christ, because "that is not saved which is not assumed." There must also be a human personality which is a very essential

of the human nature assumed. Even Christian faith, irrespective of Christian knowledge, demands that an emphasis be laid upon the human nature of Christ. So says Hutton: "To me, it would be far more painful to believe in the unreality of Christ's finite nature and human condition, than to give up Christianity altogether."

The reformed Christology, seeking to remedy the defect in current christological thought, emphasized the human nature of Christ, holding to the doctrine of the two estates. This system was better than the scholastic view which tended to evaporate the human nature of Christ, and better than the view of Luther which tended to deify it; but it failed to retain unity in Christ's personality. Nor will any system, as long as due prominence is given to both natures, succeed in removing the antinomies of divine omniscience and human ignorance, divine omnipotence and human weakness, divine omnipresence and human localization—in fact the finite and the infinite as predicated of the same being. If, however, a real unity is obtained, it is done at the expense of one of the natures. If the divine nature is emphasized, then the human is unreal and accidental, existing only in name; if the human, then God is not present except in the manner present in all good men, though in greater power. The formula, "two natures and one person," has swayed either to Adoptianism and a double personality, or to Nihilianism, the destruction of the humanity. On the one side, the human is emphasized; either it receives a grace by which its natural properties are magnified, or, the humanity is supplemented by the divine. On the other side, there is, as Irenaeus said, an occasional "quiescence" of the divine Word to allow of the human trials; or, as Luther affirmed in his earlier teaching, there was during the earthly period a limitation of the participation of the human nature in the divine attributes; or else Christ, or the divine personality, exercised a deliberate act of self-control in abstaining from the use of the divine attributes.

There has been ever a demand for a closer union of the divine and human in Christ and the need has never been satisfied. Reaction has always been succeeded by another attempt. The only solution will be reached when the conception of the two natures is dropped. That which the Bible does not demand and which is repugnant to psychological science must give place to an adequate and reasonable statement of the person of Christ. In some way

Christ must be considered human as a whole and divine as a whole. The human mind cannot as a human stereoscope combine the two natures in a composite picture. The result is confusion.

The difficulty is not one alone of the person of Christ. A return must be made to the idea of God. As long as God is the external architect of the world, it is hard to conceive of Christ as more than docetic, the flesh only a manifestation of the divine. But when God is conceived as immanent, and the Logos as the eternal principle of humanity, the manifestation of the Logos in the personality of Christ is more reasonable. The human and the divine are not contradictionaries, nor entities exclusive of each other. Truly does President Schurman say:

A closer examination may hereafter show that the Infinite Spirit includes the finite, as the idea of an organism embraces within a single life a plurality of members and functions; in which case the finite and infinite would be no longer contradictionaries and the contrast they imply would convince none but the unthinking of the incommensurability of God with the capacity of the mind of man.

The appearance of Christ then as the Word made flesh may thus be explained: The Logos is the principle of all existence and, in the process of nature's history, he is ever going out in self-manifestation in response to the demands of his own nature. In accordance with this demand, the Logos in which all is sustained was organized under the law of space and time into a human individuality, having individuated his own life into a personality subject to the conditions of all human personalities. The early church Father, Marcellus, seemed to present this view when he said, that personality in Christ arose by circumspection in divinity.

Christ is man, an individual man, as truly man as is any man. The Logos unincarnated is the basis of all humanity, but as incarnate, manifested in one personality. Yet Christ was not a separate entity from the Logos as are other men. There was a continuity of subject in the Logos which connected the two forms of manifestation. Man unlimited would not be God, but the Logos manifested in humanity is a man. The Incarnation was therefore no assumption of human nature or a clothing of the divine soul in a fleshy garment, nor the incarnation of the human life of God as some have lately said—for God's whole life was

given—nor was it strictly speaking the humanification of the Logos, for the Logos was already human in nature and personality. Human nature is not foreign to the Logos. The Incarnation was the appearance of the Logos life within the normal conditions and limitations of humanity.

A correct definition of personality does not oppose, but rather favors the idea just presented. If the Logos is not personal, as Servetus taught, there could be in Christ only a human personality as in all men by reason of the energizing of the Logos; but there could be no God-man, different in form from other men. But God is personal, and as such possesses "individuality, self-consciousness, self-determination, love, and as the result of their living interaction, character." "Is personality involving self-consciousness and self-determination predictable of the divine being?" Paulsen and Pfleiderer say that God cannot by any possibility be infra-personal. Yet he can be supra-personal; that is, he can be all we know of personality and much more.

Granting personality in the Godhead, we can agree with Orr, who, though opposed to the general idea of kenotism, says that "what is denied is that the personality of the Divine Son cannot also become in the incarnate condition a truly human one." Julius Müller, as quoted by Van Dyke, suggests that by the divine self-limitation in the Incarnation the distinctive attributes of personality are actually unified, like two circles which have a common center. The idea is somewhat mechanical, as also is every idea of kenotism, not purely ethical, but the gist of the thought remains that personality human and divine is of the same kind.

The kenotic method of statement is but the obverse side of the view already presented; that is, it proceeds from the side of the *concealment* of the divine life instead of the *manifestation*. It is therefore manifestly true but not the whole of the truth. It proceeds from the side of the contraction of the divine life in human form rather than the expression of it. Dorner is very strong in his belief that "full justice can never be done to the humanity in Christology, until the self-limitation, the self-exanition of God be recognized." The kenosis is a self-divestment of those natural prerogatives that pertain to the divine nature and the divine manner of existence, and a contraction to the dimensions of humanity.

What this limitation signified could scarcely be discovered

except inferentially from the biblical record, but it is certain that Jesus did not live habitually in the exercise of the metaphysical powers of deity, such as omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence; but it is also certain that he possessed in full the divine moral qualities. But the lack of biblical teaching does not prove the doctrine of kenotism untrue. The kenosis is the answer of the faith of many believers to the self-sacrifice of the Son of God, and to the reality of Christ's human nature.

The expression of the Logos in human personality with origination in the conception did not assure the full realization of that personality from the beginning. The Logos is not divided up mathematically in space, but the fulness of the divine life is everywhere present. Christ is as fully the God-man at infancy as at manhood, though at a different stage of development. There was no human nature not assumed, because the human was the divine under the laws of development.

The Incarnation occurred at conception, but the development was not complete until exaltation. As the "new man" in the Christian grows to the stature of the fulness of Christ, so the new life, as centered in Jesus, developed. Jesus grew—grew physically, intellectually, morally, spiritually, passing through every stage from immaturity to perfection. He "learned obedience;" he "became perfect." In the process of this development, his experiences not only corresponded to the usual human experiences, but were the same. He endured temptation. He prayed to obtain strength. He exercised trust in God. He worked miracles through divinely mediated power. There was unity in Christ's nature, not omniscience along with human ignorance, but human ignorance alone since Christ was human. There were not two wills, one the divine will and the other the human always subject to the divine will; or one "productive freedom" and the other "potence of freedom" beside it; but one will without which the unity of the personality would suffer.

Nowhere is the unity of Christ's nature more apparent than in the self-consciousness which he possessed, in which he recognized himself to be but one personality; and the unity of self-consciousness can exist only when there is a unity of nature. In Christ the self-consciousness developed as the personality developed in the new organism. During the first part of that life the consciousness

of his divine character and mission "followed the same law of development as his other faculties," and so "his divine sonship . . . was at first a matter of faith rather than knowledge or immediate revelation."

Thus are the unity of nature and limitations of activities, and the process of development, all consonant with the theses of psychology, and at the same time consistent with biblical teachings. Grant that the Logos is immanent in the universe, that the divine and human are akin, that the Logos is the principle of the human race, that a new center of life is possible by the ever-energizing presence of the Logos; then, the development of the Christ-life under psychological conditions is manifestly the divine way.

## CHAPTER VI

### JESUS AND THE LOGOS

Among the many questions that arise upon the acceptance of the vital relationship of the Logos and Jesus, one of the first is, How does Jesus differ from other men? The first answer to this might be that Jesus is God's son. Yet sonship is chiefly ethical in its content, and there can be no double or puzzling sense in which the word is applied both to Jesus and to the believer. Christ as son is that which we ought to be and are destined to become. He is the prototype and ideal of man at his highest development.

Jesus is also the ideal of holiness and sinlessness. Humanity as capable of divinity never reached its completion until Jesus lived. Christ during the years of earthly history passed through the ideal man's eternal history. Such holiness, such completion of humanity, such ideal history, can be reached only by one who is the Logos incarnate, and not by one in whom God indwells as in any believer. Sonship, holiness, perfection, are but the results and expressions of the divine life, lived under human limitations. Yet ethical union with the Father must not be made synonymous with unity of nature. Hutton in his essays makes this mistake of confusing the effect with the cause, when he says:

The ultimate distinction between Christ's human nature and our own lay not, it seems to me, in any exemption from human ignorance, sensitiveness, temptation, but in the ultimate divinity expressed in His free will, which moulded itself according to the Father's will without a moment's trembling in the balance.

One fundamental difference between Jesus and all other men is that Christ was the firstborn without whom none other ever attained unto sonship and eternal life. He as son is the source of all human sonship, as perfect, the source of all perfection, as holy, the source of all human holiness. But the supreme difference, which is the source of all differences, is that in man personality and substance form a distinct entity, while Christ's nature is identical with that of God. In the one, the Logos is the sustaining principle separate from the human being sustained but without which the personality would not exist; in the other, the Logos is identical

with the human being formed. In one, therefore, independence of action, ethical separation, is possible; in the other, the will is continuative with the volition of the Logos, and the ethical union with the Father ever the same.

The idea of God must be more ethical and less metaphysical. Immutability and immobility are not the same in God. It is not the sameness of expression that marks the immutability of God, but the continuity of underlying purpose. Or as Canon Gore says: "We can readily conceive that the attributes and powers of God must be more wholly, than is the case with us, under the control of the will. They must be less mechanical and more voluntary." However, the difficulty which adherents of the doctrine of kenotism meet begins at the gateway of creation itself, for the very creation and sustentation of matter is a part of that self-limitation of God that reaches its culmination in the person of Christ. Either God is not immanent, or else there is no inherent difficulty in supposing that the Word became flesh and dwelt among us.

The Logos is the source of life from which all things derive their existence; and yet the universe is not an extension of the divine substance. The category of space does not apply to the Logos for the fulness of his divinity is everywhere as an ever-present factor. But the Logos has not exhausted himself in the universe. He is immanent and transcendent both, and therefore infinite in his resources. The Logos is God's self-revelation, and in the Logos is the totality of God's revelations, now in nature, now in humanity, and finally in a person; but the resourceful energy of the Logos possesses further possibilities of revelation. If the Christ is the upward movement of the fundamental life beneath, not exhausted by this one germination and growth, might not even Aquinas be correct in believing that more than one incarnation was possible, though only one was accomplished?

The conclusion of this method of presentation is so apparent that it scarcely needs statement—that while the Logos was on earth in the limitations of humanity, he was, as ever, exerting his world-control, and continuing in his eternal relations with the Father. Any other form of the theory of depotentiation is at least subject to three grave objections: that it changes the immanent relations of the Trinity; that it makes finite what is infinite (not to speak of the impossible return of the finite to the infinite);

and that it fails to explain the center of world-control during the Incarnation. The world-control certainly during the Incarnation was not vested in Jesus, nor is there any indication that it was personally transferred to the Father.

The possibility of the twofold mode of life is met by the objection that there could not be two centers of consciousness, or that the kenosis was not real; but the practical answer to all metaphysical difficulties is to point to the fact that in his exalted life, Christ had this twofold mode of existence, being the unifying principle of the universe and yet locally manifested in his heavenly form. That the condition of the exalted state cannot also be the condition of the incarnate state, is what some do not seem to see although it is clear that the presence of Christ in heaven, while being a local and visible presence, was not necessarily limited to the circumference of its human form. Jesus was the Logos, that is, the fulness of the Godhead, but the Bible does not say the Logos is Jesus and Jesus never says, I am the Logos. Rather the interest is ethical, and John says that "these are written that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ (not that Jesus is the Logos) and that believing ye may have life in his name." But the Gospel of John begins with the significant statement, the Logos became flesh.

This view as presented above is neither so new nor unusual, though with few exceptions never developed into a system. Athanasius says that "the Logos, while present in the human body and himself quickening it, was, without inconsistency, quickening the universe as well and was in every process of nature." At the Protestant Reformation, when the subject of the person of Christ was most discussed, this phase of the theme was approximated by the old Lutheran theology maintaining that the Logos while united with humanity remained unchanged and governed the world omnipresently. But what was regarded as a logical conclusion invalidated the doctrine, that as all of the Logos must have been incarnated, therefore the flesh of Christ must have been everywhere present. Calvin seemed more truly to speak when he wrote in his *Institutes*: "The Son of God descended in a wonderful manner from heaven, but so that he did not leave heaven."

Of late there have been many direct and indirect references to the subject of the double life, or more properly the single life with a personal development under the conditions of time and

space. Dr. George Jamieson in *A Revised Theology* says that "while the Logos was represented upon the earth in the person of the Lord Jesus Christ, yet the Logos remained in his entirety in heaven." And James Orr, while denying all kenotic theories, makes this remarkable statement: "There is an immanent presence of God in nature. So the Divine Son took upon him our nature with its human limits, but above and beyond that, if we may so express it, was the vast 'over-soul of his Divine consciousness.'" The point of view is immaterial. Whether it is the "over-soul" as representing the action of the transcendent God, or the "inner-soul" as representing the immanent God, the life within and beneath is the ever-present Logos-life, ever rising in more or less permanent forms as the manifestation of God, but manifested at the end of the times as Christ in the flesh.

## CHAPTER VII

### JESUS AND THE FATHER

Bruce has said in his *Kingdom of God*, that "a thoroughly Christian idea of God is still a desideratum, and when the church has reached it, the kingdom of God shall have come in power." This is paralleled by the statement of one of the authors of *Lux Mundi* that "every moral reformation within the church was a protest of the conscience against unworthy views of God." Not only does our view of Christ react upon our view of God, but the preconceived and mechanical notions of God have ever driven the church to behold in Christ the incarnation of a philosophically conceived God.

The Gnostic idea of the Bythos, the neo-Platonic idea of the *δύναμις*, and Renan's phrase "Our Father, the Abyss," are all of the same stamp. A definition of a mathematical infinity, as applied to God, is full of contradictions, and brings us to practical atheism. If the difference between God and man is one between the infinite and finite, then Mansel and Spencer are right in teaching that God may be different from our conception of him, and Spencer, in concluding that the forms of human conduct are to be regulated irrespective of him.

In answer to the philosophical idea of God, the believer first says with Fiske that the "total elimination of anthropomorphism from the idea of God is impossible;" then adds, that anthropomorphism is not only necessary but correspondent with the fact. He concludes that "God is eternally and essentially God-man. Man is eternally and essentially man-God." He does not need to make Christ real by saying that in Christ is "the human life of God," nor to see in Christ the incarnation of the human qualities of God. He affirms that God and man are essentially one, and that a correct idea of God is possible in an ideal human personality.

The complete revelation of God cannot be made except through a human personality who shall be God in the flesh, revealing God's eternal power and divinity. Only a personality could reveal God's personality and moral character. The Incarnation is a climax in revelation. If therefore a self-revelation is an immanent necessity

to God, then is the Incarnation the goal of nature. If the idea of God implies creation, it implies the Incarnation.

Christianity is not an excrescence. God's eternal plan was formed with reference to Christ; creation and redemption are correlated. The purpose of the Incarnation is co-ordinate with other purposes, and the universe has as the completion of its idea the manifestation of God in Christ. Whether the Logos would have become flesh irrespective of sin cannot be answered except on a hypothesis contrary to fact. Yet an affirmative answer seems possible from the fact that Jesus accomplishes more for believers than to restore them to the state of primeval man. The Logos in whom all existed needed objective presentation. As Calvin says: "Had man remained free from all taint, he was of too humble a condition to penetrate to God without a mediator."

Christ is therefore an ethical revelation to the world. God is to be interpreted through Christ, and the Son is a manifestation of the moral and personal attributes of God. Christ, as the image of God's substance, was the revelation of the essential personality of God. That which is essential in God was not revealed in Christ by examples of wonder-working and knowledge and ability to annihilate space, which miraculous power was as divinely mediated as in any other man, for *finitum capax infiniti* can never be true as respects the metaphysical qualities.

God is love, and Christ was the incarnation of love. Such an idea of God, Dorner strenuously advocates—"viewing God, not as mere holiness and righteousness, nor as mere goodness and communicableness in general, but as love which possesses power over itself—in one word, as holy love." Then may the Incarnation be a concentration of love, a qualitative localizing of God in humanity. Hayden always manifested God in sweet melodies, because, he said, "The divinity should always be expressed by love and goodness." The essential part of God's nature is not in those qualities that pass our comprehension, but in his ethical nature which is summed up in the word Father, of which Christ in his sonship is a true revelation.

Love sacrifices, and the sacrifice of Christ is the revealing of the eternal sacrifice of God. Nowhere in the New Testament is the Incarnation spoken of as if the matter of wonder was in the method of the Incarnation rather than the motive. It is always

"so loved that he gave;" "for the suffering of death crowned with glory and honor;" "let this same mind be in you." It was the love of the Father that necessitated the revelation of the Son. The form depended upon the purpose to be accomplished; and since human beings were to be saved, the abode was established "in the flesh."

"The very God," think, Abib; dost thou think?  
So, the All-Great, were the All-Loving too—  
So, through the thunder comes a human voice  
Saying, "O heart, I made, a heart beats here!  
Face, my hands fashioned, see it in myself!  
Thou hast no power nor may'st conceive of mine:  
But love I gave thee, with myself to love,  
And thou must love me who have died for thee!"

## CHAPTER VIII

### JESUS AND THE HOLY SPIRIT

The New Testament plainly teaches that believers are not only to be transformed into the image of Christ, being created anew after the divine image; but that they are even now vitally united with him. Believers are "in Christ;" they are the branches, he the vine; he is the head, they the body. We are planted together (*σύμφυτοι*) in the likeness of his death. From the world we are "added unto the Lord" finding in him the channel of the communication of spiritual life, and in him not only a fellowship, but a communion of nature.

This union is consummated by the action of the Holy Spirit upon the human nature. The early church looked much upon the expression of the presence of the Spirit in the external manifestations similar to those of Pentecost; but under a present psychology as well as the biblical teaching, since "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth," it is to be concluded that the immanent action of the Holy Spirit in human nature is below consciousness. The beginning of this new life and vital union to Christ is "of the Spirit." We are born of the Spirit, and it is the Spirit that quickeneth. The Spirit is not only the medium of this change, but also is the assurance of new life. Christ is in us by the presence of the Holy Spirit, and is the creative and unifying principle of the new moral life whereby we become partakers of the divine nature in Christ.

But that which the Holy Spirit accomplishes for believers as the agent of regeneration and growth he accomplished in Jesus. The Bible never represents the birth, growth, and consummation of Christ's life as due to the divine nature united to the human, but always as through the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is the mediator of all finite action and progress, physical, intellectual, and spiritual. The Christ of history, as well as the Christ within us, passes through the phases of human progress by the Holy Spirit. The likeness is striking. Christ is born through the action of the Spirit, and so are we. The Holy Spirit abides in both alike. The

Father seals the Son by the descent of the Spirit at the time of baptism; and has also sealed us giving us the earnest of the Spirit. The Spirit is Christ's anointing, so also is he ours. Jesus was led by the Spirit, and so also as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. Jesus rejoices in the Spirit, and the fruit of the Spirit in believers is joy. Jesus even performed miracles, not by the inherent power that is supposed to dwell in the Word made flesh, but by the Spirit of God; it is also after the Spirit is come that we can ask anything in Christ's name and he will do it for us. Jesus returned from the Jordan "full of the Holy Spirit," and the disciples were filled with the Spirit to fit them for their various activities. Jesus is declared to be the Son of God with power according to the Spirit of holiness; "but if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwelleth in you, he that raised up Christ Jesus from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies through his Spirit that dwelleth in you."

Thus the Holy Spirit was to Jesus what he is to us, being the principle of personal life for both, and accomplishing in us all that he accomplished in Christ. By the descent of the Spirit upon Christ, he is declared to be the Son of God, that is, ethically one with God; in like manner as many as are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God.

What then, is the relation of Jesus to believers in this process, and in what way is Jesus the source of our own spiritual life through the Spirit? One answer to these questions is an appeal to the constitution of the immanent Trinity. Unfortunately, there are no commonly accepted views as to the internal relations of the members of the Godhead, and an independent discussion would become a previous question to the present consideration. One must agree with Dorner in saying that "It may be asserted that our age especially needs a living renascence of the apprehension of a triune God, and indeed a new formulation of the concept of God generally by means of that renascence." The doctrine of the Trinity is not yet complete, and yet the doctrine is necessary in opposing all unworthy views of God, and in furnishing an adequate foundation for the doctrine of redemption.

However, no view of the immanent Trinity would be of value in the present discussion, except as it affected the theory of the incarnate life of the Logos. If, for example, the Spirit is the

very condition of the personal self-conscious life of God, then the office of the Spirit in the life of God might be considered analogous to the similar work as performed in the person of Christ, and as far as the new regenerate personality is concerned, in believers. President Strong says, "Christ represents the centrifugal action of the deity, but there must be a centripetal action also. In the Holy Spirit the movement is completed and the divine activity and thought returns into itself." If this view were to be accepted, the work of the Holy Spirit in Christ and in believers could be considered a part of the same great process, having its origin in the eternal relationship of the Godhead.

Athanasius was right when he wrote the following:

God calls men, who are created, sons, as though they had been begotten. As they are created natures, they can only become sons by receiving the Spirit of him who is by nature and truly Son. He who was our creator, becomes our Father, from which it is clear that we are not by nature sons but the Son who is in us. Nor is God by nature our Father, but the Father of the Word, which is in us. But the Father designates those sons in whom he sees his Son.

The Spirit is not simply a companion of the human soul, indwelling as a separate principle. Our spiritual nature is a new life-organization brought about by the Holy Spirit. But this new nature is vitally united with that of Christ. Christ is reborn in every individual in whom the Holy Spirit takes up his abode. Truly it seems to be the meaning of I Cor. 12:12, the church is "the Christ." Christ is the head of which the church is the body, and by one Spirit are we all baptized into this one body. The body of Christ perpetuates the union of humanity with the Godhead.

Yet this union with Christ through the Spirit does not destroy the personality. One cannot say as did one of Weigel's followers to another: "I am Christ Jesus, the living Word of God; I have redeemed thee by my sinless sufferings." Each man is a free personality who by virtue of his faith in Christ is a reincarnation. The Christ-life is not subversive to the highest personality, since by the action of the Spirit the bond between Christ and the soul is spontaneous and reciprocal.

Nevertheless, the new species of life as represented in the body of Christ could never have received its origination outside of Christ. The Spirit's organizing power must first be found in an individual, that is, Christ; and from this source the divine life

flows to the world. There must be a dynamic source of the regenerated personal life in humanity, and that source is Christ. Such is the evolutionary phase of the Incarnation that Christ is the first of a new type from which the successive individuals spring; the firstborn among many brethren. This is the purpose of the Incarnation, to establish a focus of the new human life, for a higher order of created beings. Without Christ, therefore, God could not have saved the world. Faith is the contact whereby the Spirit ingrafts us into the Son, that from him as the vine we as the branches may receive sustenance. "Jesus is the object to be assimilated, the Spirit is the assimilating power." Thus is it ever true—"A man may become a God-like man, but never a God-man; this last, Christ alone remains."





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